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ABSTRACT 
Previous  investigators  have  shown that the Sharpe  measure 
of the performance  of a managed  portfolio  may be flawed when 
the  portfolio  manager  has  market  timing ability. 
We develop the exact conditions under which the Sharpe 
measure  will completely  and correctly  order market  timers 
according  to ability.  The derived conditions  are  necessary, 
sufficient,  and observable.  We compare  them to empirical 
estimates  of actual  market  conditions,  and find that  the 
circumstances  which  can lead to a failure  of the Sharpe 
measure  do  in fact  occur.  We show,  however,  that such 
failures  can  be greatly  reduced by more frequent  sampling. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Admati and Ross  [1J,  Dybvig  and Ross  [3], and Grant [4] 
demonstrate  that the portfolio  of a market  timer having 
superior  information  can appear mean—variance  inefficient  to 
an outside  observer.  In particular,  they  find that the 
Sharpe [10] measure  of the performance  of a portfolio 
managed  by a  skilled market  timer can indicate performance 
which is inferior  to that of the  market.  We consider  here 
whether  such a measurement  error is likely to occur in 
practice  by developing  the exact condition  under  which  the 
Sharpe  measure  will fail to order timers  according  to 
ability.  We re-examine the condition  specified  by Dybvig 
and Ross, and derive  one which is both necessary  and 
sufficient.  We then test that requirement  against  data 
presented  by Nerton [8]  and show  that the Sharpe  measure is 
in fact likely to be deficient  under actual market 
conditions  given the current  industry practice  of using 
quarterly  data. 
* 
We  would like to thank Alan Marcus  for valuable  comments. Note that  the source  of this  measurement  error  is  unobserved  shifts  in 
portfolio  composition  that result  in a nonnormal  unconditional  distribution  of 
returns.  See Dybvig-Ross.  If information  on portfolio  shifts  is available 
then it can be used to measure  performance.  (An interesting  technology  for 
using portfolio  shifts  has been developed  and  ised by Merton  [9], Henriksson 
and Merton  [61, Henriksson  [1, and Cheng  and Lewellen  [21 to test  market 
timing  ability and by Kane,  Lee, and Marks  [7] to test yield curve 
prediction.)  Unfortunately,  information  on portfolio  composition  is 
infrequently  disclosed.  The Sharpe  measure remains  the industry  standard  for 
portfolio  performance  measurement.  Even though  our results show  that the 
Sharpe  measure  calculated  on quarterly  data  is  deficient  under actual market 
conditions,  we also conclude  that more frequent  (e.g. monthly  or  daily) 
sampling greatly mitigates  the problem.  That is, with  more frequent  sampling 
the Sharpe  measure will correctly  order timers  according  to ability,  even  in 
the absence of information  on portfolio  composition. 
-2- II.  Conditions  for a Complete  Ordering 
Dybvig  and Ross [3] posit an environment  in which  there are two assets. 
One is riskless with return  r.  The other is the market portfolio 
which  is risky with return  x = r +  +  +  where  ir  is  the market  risk 
premium,  5  is  the signal  observed by the portfolio manager but not by an 
outside observer, and  is noise.  For convenience, the risk-free rate, is 
assumed to be zero and s and  are assumed to be independent  normally 
2 
distributed with zero means and variances  and  .  Uninformed  investors 
estimate the variance of x to be 2  =  + . The  manager invests a unit 
amount under a constant absolute risk aversion utility function U()  = 
-exp[—Afl with  P > 0.  Dybvig-Ross  assume that the manager maximizes  client 
utility, i.e., that there are no principal—agent  problems.  We make this 
assumption as well 
Both Grant  and Dybvig-Ross compare a market-timer  to a  nontimer.  Our 
interest is to compare timers to each other  in order  to rank them according  to 
ability.  We assume that manager 
i  does not observe s directly but receives a 
signal, z1.,  that is conditionally normally distributed  with mean s and 
2 
variance . That  is, zs 
— l(s,c).  In Oybvig-Ross,  would be  zero. 
We, however, will allow  to take on all  positive values.  In this way, 
we will he able to  rank timers; good timers will have lower 
Unconditionally,  z  will be  correlated with  s  with correlation 
coefficient 
Cov(z  ,s) 
= 
—3— Again,  in Dybvig-Ross  p. would  be one.  In our model p 
can be  any number 
in the unit interval.  Better  timers will  have higher 
Since  Cov(z,s) = E5E(zs 
= 
2  2 
and  Var(z.)  =  a  + 
we have that 
9 
___________________  as 
p. =  = 






Because the unconditional expectation of z  is zero, we  can use the above 
relationships  to state the conditional  and unconditional distrihutions  of 
in terms of s,  and  as: 
9 





hl(O,  a/p) 
Given the distributions of zj zIs, 
and s we  can specify the 






where f refers  to the probability  density functions.  Hence, 





is  not an unbiased estimator of s, we can  obtain  one by using 
zi = Pz 
instead  of z, where 
— 
4(O, p) 
2  2  22 
zds 
— N(s, p1(1—p1)5) 
N(z1, (1—)) 
Empirically,  can  be estimated from past  forecasting  errors. 
With a zero—risk-free  rate, the return on  the  market can  be  written as 
X=1r+S+c 





Portfolio manager  i will  invest a proportion, y'.,  of fund i  in the market 
and the remaining proportion,  'i' in the risk-free asset.  These 
proportions will depend on the information, zi 
available  to the manager; 
that  is,  = i(z).  The return on  the portfolio therefore will be 
[i(z)]x.  Following Dybvig—Ross  3]  we assume that  is chosen  to 
maximize  the negative exponential  utility function 
U =  Er_exp(_Axxflz1 
where x is normally-distributed  conditional on z.  Using the normal 
moment-generating  function, we may rewrite utility as 
U = _exp[_AE(xIs) 
+ 4  AyVar(xs1)] 
Maximizing this is equivalent  to maximizing 
- 4 
+ 
where  we have substituted  for the conditional  expectation  and variance  from 
the relationships above.  At  a maximum, then, 
+ 
zi  (1) 
227 
Af(1_  )g+] 
-6- and we may hereafter drop the subscript  i.  Pote that if  =  1,  we  have the 
case considered  by Dybvig-Ross. 
Grant and Dybvig-Ross  show that,  from the viewpoint of an outside 
observer, a  market-timer may appear mean—variance  inefficient.  That is, a 
naive  investor would expect  to obtain the same mean and a lower variance  in 
his or  her portfolio by taking a fixed position in the risky and risk-free 
assets.  Equivalently, the unconditional  Sharpe [10] measure S for the fund 
(defined as the risk premium over  the standard deviation) may be lower for a 
timer with  > 0  than for the market.  Consider the square of the Sharpe 
measure,  since it is mathematically  more  convenient.  We  can express this as a 
function of  ability, p, in  the form 
2  222 
S2(p2) = [E(y(z)x)]2  =  + 
.  (2) 
Var(y(z)x)  +  2  [3+2÷2]  +  2(2+2) 
Comparing  the squared Sharpe measure of  the best timer (  =1)  to  a passive 
strategy, of holding the market  portfolio (p20), we have 
2 
S(1)  < S(0) if 
22  22  422  6  2  —  —aa/r  —/ir  >0 
S  Sc  Sc  S 
which  is the result found by both Grant and Dybvig-Ross.  Unfortunately, 
is not observable.  However, flybviq-Ross  show that this condition will 
—7— be satisfied if ir  >  +  a which guarantees that the first term of the 
inequality dominates the others.  The sum  + a of  course  is just 
the observable market  variance, which we denote by .  Thus,  we  have an 
observable condition  >  a2 which,  if satisfied, implies that a  timer 
will be mean-variance  inferior to a nontiiner  (have a lower Sharpe measure). 
However, this observable condition,  while being sufficient,  is  not necessary. 
That is,  even if  < 2 it is possible for a timer to appear 
mean—variance  inferior to  a nontimer.  In  addition, it is possible for 
superior timers to appear mean-variance  inferior to  inferior timers. 
We may then determine the conditions  under which  Sharpe measure will 
provide a complete correct ordering of  timers according to  ability, and the 
conditions  under which  it will  fail.  That is, we may compare managers of 
different abilities.  The derivative  of S2(2') with respect to  ability, 
2. 
p  ,  15 
2  24  2222  2a  2p  a  a  [3r 4a a  1  5—  5  S  Sc 
1  (3) 
2  2 22  44  2  2  2 2  +  2  2  2  dp  p a 
p  a 
+ p3r  a5 
a  ]  r (a5  a) 
and from this expression we  can obtain several important  results. 
Proposition  1:  Greater ability will yield  a higher  Sharpe measure than lesser 
ability for all p2ctO,1i if  and only  if a 
+ a2  >  32  For the 
proof, see the Appendix. This guarantees that S2(p2) will  be monotoriically  increasing  in  p2 
for all p2 > 0 if and only if  > 32  and thereby that the Sharpe 
measure will correctly order ability through the whole range of abilities. 
The condition for a complete inverse ordering is given by: 
Proposition 2.  Greater ability will yield a lower Sharpe measure than lesser 
ability for all  p2c[0,1] if  +  < 2  The proof is also 
contained  in the Appendix. 
It is interesting to  note that the condition ,2 < 2  not only implies 
that  S2(1) < S2(0) as Dybvig—Ross  suggested but, more  strongly, that 
22  22  7  ° 
S  < S ()  whenever  > p.  That is,  it implies 
a complete inverse ordering of  performance.  Such an ordering is of course 
just  as useful as a complete correct ordering in the absence of principal- 
agent problems.  From  these two propositions, we  can divide market  conditions 
into three ir, regions, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure  1 Goes  Here 
In region A, utility maximizing  managers will be ordered in exactly the wrong 
way.  In region C, ability will be ordered exactly correctly by the Sharpe 
measure.  In region  B  there will  always be misordering  over some range of 
ability.  It should be  noted  that the condition  for a complete and correct 
ordering of  ability by the Sharpe measure (a2 > 312)  is both strong (i.e., 
necessary and sufficient)  and observable.  We may also use the estimates supplied by tIerton  [8] to  consider whether this condition has been violated  in 
the past. 
lit.  Empirical Estimates 
The problem with using the Sharpe measure to order timers  is that although 
x is normally distributed, the unconditional  distribution of the timers 
portfolio  returns, [i(Z'lX, is  nonnormal  (it has a chi—square  element  [3]), 
Nevertheless,  from Proposition  1 we know  that mean and variance will order 
timers correctly  if and only if ir/a  <  .577  where r and  are stated  in terms 
of  the observation  interval. 
The usual practice in portfolio performance  measurement  is to use 
quarterly data.  Therefore we  will assess the viabiflty  of the Sharpe measure 
assuming a quarterly measurement  interval for measuring  fund performance.  The 
most  comprehensive estimates of  the mean return on a market  index are given by 
Merton [8].  Merton  uses a Bayesian prior of  a positive 
risk premium to estimate V1 /a (see his model 2) from monthly data where a 
is the market  risk premium and a is the market  standard deviation.  We add the 
subscript M to Mertons notation to indicate that it is a monthly estimate. 
We  will apply the condition on the Sharpe measure with quarterly data. 
Since all rates are continuously compounded,  we may convert Mertons monthly 
estimates  of ? into quarterly estimates (regardless  of the level of the 
risk-free rate) by noting  that 
1r0=  taM_  i 
a0 
= 
where  t  is the number of  months  in a quarter and thus that 
-10- = 
where  the subscripts Q and M refer to quarterly and monthly rates respectively. 
Table 1  presents ilertons data for thirteen four year sampling periods 
covering the years 1P26-197.  The last column, T,  lists the longest 
corresponding  observation  interval (in months) for which the Sharpe measure 
would  not fail  given liertons  estimates.  This  break-even  period  is 
determined by 
= 
4  = 
3 
Table  1 Goes Here 
As Dybvig-Ross  noted, mismeasurement  using Sharpe measure has its cause in 
the nonnormality of  the unconditional distribution of returns.  The above 
indicates that for short intervals this nonnormal element  is not large  enough 
to  affect  the validity of  the Sharpe measure.  As the interval gets longer we 
reach a point (T) where  reversals begin to occur. 
It is fascinating that, even though the source of  nonnormality  is shifts 
in portfolio composition, the point at  which reversals occur  (T) does not 
depend on A in equation (1).  (A  can be  considered  to be  a shift parameter. 
—11— Lower values result  in greater shifts.)  Rather, 1 depends only on market 
conditions  as given by  ?, the  Sharpe measure of  the market.  The above result 
states that the higher the Sharpe measure of the market, the greater the 
degree of  nonnormality and the more difficult  it is for timers to distinguish 
themselves from the market  and from each other.  That is,  reversals occur at 
smaller interval  5. 
From Table 1, we see that in six of  the 13 subperiods, the Sharpe measure 
would either fail 
(YQ> 
0.577 or T <  3)  or come  close  to failing for a 
quarterly observation  interval (1=3).  Merton  also estimated  over 52  1-year 
intervals and found the average monthly estimate to be .3719.  This results in 
= .6441 
which  is again over the threshold of .577.  Thus, the conditions  for the Sharpe 
measure to order timers  incorrectly according to ability do seem to occur 
frequently.  The table also suggests that monthly observations would greatly 
mitigate,  if not eliminate,  the problem. 
—12— IV  CONCLUSIONS 
Grant  [4],  Dybvig-Ross  [31 and Admati-oss  El] have shown that the Sharpe 
[10] measure of the performance of  the portfolio of a  market  timer having 
superior  information can he inferior to that of  a passive portfolio.  Herein 
we developed  the  exact conditions  under which  the Sharpe measure will 
completely  and correctly  order market  timers according to ahility.  The 
condition derived  is  necessary, sufficient,  and observable.  We compared this 
requirement  to the empirical estimates of  market conditions  reported by Merton 
[8].  We found that the conditions  for  a  failure of  the Sharpe measure have in 
fact occurred.  Nevertheless, we show that such failures can be greatly 
reduced by more frequent sampling. 
-  13- Appendix:  Proofs of Propositions 
Proposition 1:  Greater ability will yield a higher Sharpe measure than lesser 
ability for all  02c[U,il if and only if  +  > 3,2 
Proof:  From  equation  (ci,  we have that 
dS2(O)  52(O)5(2+2)(2+232)  (Al) 
Additionally, from equation (3),  S2(p2) can be written in the form 
= ap4 + 
hO: 
+ 
+  d  + e 
where a, b, c, d, and e are constants.  Thus 
2  4  2 
dS  = a(d-bo  + 2a(e-c)p 
+  (be-dc) 
2  4  2  2 
(ap 
+  d0  +  e  I 
The  numerator has, at most, two roots in . The  denominator is always 
positive.  From equation (3), we see that one root occurs where S  = 0. 
9  99 
From  equation  (2),  we  know that S  = 0 if an only if  +  =  0. 
2  7? 
Thus,  one root occurs at  p  =  —(/.  Again  from equation (3),  we 
see that the other root occurs at 
-14- 22  22  + 
S 
—  S  S  Sc 
2  22  44  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  +  r3+0+]+T(2+2) 
S  S  S  Sc  Sc 
2 
Solving  this expression for  (by  finding the common denominator and then 
setting the numerator equal to zero) results in 
2  2  32  - 
=  S  c 
9  2  2  2  -+  2 
2  2  2  If  + 
0c  > 3, both roots are negative.  If this is the case, then 
22  2  2 
dS /dp  is positive at  = 0 (by Al) and never becomes 0 as p 
22  22 
increases.  Also, dS /dp  is continuous.  Thus, dS /dp  must be 
9 
positive  for p  > 0.  This completes the  if  part of the proof.  The 'only 
2  ,  2  22 
if  follows directly from Al.  If  +  < 3  ,  then  dS /dp 
2  2  at p  0 is negative and Y  fails for some values of p.  QED. 
Proposition  2.  Greater ability will  yield a  lower Sharpe measure than lesser 
2  2  2  2 
ability for all  0,lJ if  +  < it 
2  2  2  2  2  2 
Proof  dS/d  is negative at p  = 0  since 
+ 
implies  + 2  < 32  and we  can apply Proposition 1.  Consider 
then the roots of dS2/d22.  As was stated in the proof of proposition 1, 
one root  in p2 is always negative.  The other, equation (Al),  can be 
rewritten as 
—15- '2  2  2irr34 
S 
0 
2  222 
2  2  ' 
Since  ir  >  + f  it  follows that 
£ 
2  ' 
C  2 
S  1  <— and  11.>  1 
2 + 2 +  2  2  2 
¶ 
S  £ 
2 
which  means  that  this  root  occurs  at  p  >  1  and that 5(c)  never 
reaches a minimum in [0,1]. 
Q.E.0. 




In  Region B: Two  possibilities 
Figure  1 
Market Conditions and  Ordering by  Sharpe  Measure 
Region  A 
B 
Market Variance (.i) 
C 
In  Region  C 
Complete Correct  Ordering 
In  Region  A 
Complete Inverse  Ordering 
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1  0 
Ability  (F1) Table  1 
Estimates  of  Vms  and T for 4-Year  Time Intervals 
July 1926  - June  1978 
7/26- 6/30  .2768  .4794  4.35 
7/30 
-  6/34  .1122  .1943  26.48 
7/34 - 6/38  .2675  .4633  4.66 
7/38  -  6/42  .0790  .1368  53.41 
7/42 - 6/46  .5510  .9544  1.10 
7/46 — 6/50  .1715  .2970  11.33 
7/50 - 6/54  .4119  .7134  1.96 
7/54  -  6/58  .3027  .5243  3.64 
7/58 - 6/62  .2370  .4103  5.93 
7/62 
-  6/66  .3336  .5778  3.00 
7/66 - 6/70  .1037-  .1787  31.30 
7/70 - 5/74  .1424  .2466  16.44 
7/74  - 6/78  .1547  .2679  13.93 
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